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‘The most beautiful and profound experience is the feeling of mystery. It underlies religion as 
well as all deeper aspirations in art and science.’  Einstein 
 
 
Introduction  
 
 Science is a crowning glory of the human spirit and its applications remain our best hope for 
social progress. However, there are limitations to existing science and perhaps to any science. 
The general mind-body problem is known to be currently intractable and mysterious (8). This is 
one of many deep problems that are generally agreed to be beyond the present purview of 
Science, including many quantum phenomena, etc. However, all of these famous unsolved 
problems are either remote from everyday experience (entanglement, dark matter) or are hard 
to even define sharply (phenomenology, consciousness, etc.).  
 
 In this note, we will consider some computational problems in vision that arise every time that 
we open our eyes and yet are demonstrably inconsistent with current theories of neural 
computation. The focus will be on two famous related phenomena, known as the neural 
binding problem and the experience of a detailed stable visual world. I, among many others, 
have struggled with these issues for more than fifty years (1, 2, 3). Somewhat paradoxically, 
the continuing progress in scientific methods and knowledge reveals that these are both 
unsolvable within existing neuroscience. By considering some basic facts about how the brain 
processes image input, we will show that, under the standard theory, there are not nearly 
enough brain neurons to compute what we experience as vision. Inconsistencies like the ones 
shown here have had a profound effect on paradigm change in the sciences. More directly, the 
discussions below suggest possible new theories and experiments. 
 
Demonstrations 
 
 The visual system can only capture fine detail in a small ( ~1 degree) part of the visual field; 
this is about the size of your thumbnail at arm’s length. “The experience of a detailed full-field 
stable visual world” refers to our subjective perception of a large high-resolution scene. First, 
consider Figure 1. Your vision is best in the center of gaze and the small letters in the center of 
the figure are easy to read when you look directly at them, but not when you look to the side. 
The letters further from the center are progressively larger and this describes how much 
coarser your vision becomes with eccentricity. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Size for Equal Visibility with Eccentricity 
 
 
   You can experience this directly using the line of text in Figure 2. Cover or close one eye and 
focus on the + in the center from a distance of about 12 inches. While holding focus, try to 
name the letters to the left. You should be able to do much better with the progressively larger 
letters to the right of the +. In ordinary viewing, there is no problem because we change our 
gaze several times a second. 
            U       Q     C     G    O   +  C    O     U   Q G 
Figure 2.  Demonstration of Visibility with Eccentricity 
 
 More generally, representing more information requires more hardware, which is why new 
phones are marketed as having cameras with more megapixels. This is also true for the 
neurons in the brain and this fact will play a major role in the discussion. There is a great deal 
known about how the brain processes visual information, largely because other mammals, 
particularly primates, have quite similar visual systems. We will focus on primary visual cortex 
or V1. Looking ahead, Figure 4B shows a flattened and projected view of the human brain with 
V1 on the far left.  
 
 Unsurprisingly, the brain realizes its high central resolution using many, densely packed, 
neurons. The central portion of the retina in the eye is the fovea and the downstream target of 
these foveal neurons in V1 of the brain is called the foveal projection.  
 
Figure 3. Tootell, et al. Experiment (4) 
 
An important aspect of this architecture can be seen in Figure 3. The upper part of the figure 
depicts an oscillating radial stimulus, also with more detail in the center, which was presented 
to a primate subject. The lower half of the figure shows the parts of visual cortex that 
responded strongly to the input. As you can see, by far the most activity is the foveal projection 
on the far left, corresponding to the detailed image in the center of the input stimulus (red 
arrow). So, vision is most accurate in a small central area of the visual field and this is 
achieved by densely packed neurons in the corresponding areas of the brain (4). 
 
 However, our visual experience is not at all like this. We experience the world as fully detailed 
and there is currently no scientific explanation of this. There is more - we normally move 
(saccade) our gaze to new places in the scene about 3 or 4 times per second.  These 
saccades help us see and act effectively and are not random. Again, our experience does not 
normally include any awareness of the saccades or the radically different visual inputs that 
they entail.  Taken together these unknown links between brain and experience are known as 
“the experience of a detailed stable visual world” and this is generally accepted, if not 
understood.  
 
There is extensive continuing research on various aspects of visual stability (6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11). 
None of this work attempts to provide a complete solution and it is usually explicit that deep 
mysteries remain.  Reference 9 is an excellent survey of behavioral findings and reference 11 
has current neuroscience results. 
 
We are attempting here to establish a much stronger statement. These stable world 
phenomena and a number of others are inconsistent with standard theories of neural 
processing (20). The demonstrations below involve combining findings from several distinct 
areas of investigation, as an instance of Unified Cognitive Science (12).  Before digging in to 
the computational details, we consider some consequences of establishing that there is 
presently no scientific explanation of such visual experiences. 
 
Why Inconsistency is important 
 
It may seem surprising that we can exhibit such strong results without directly considering the  
relation between subjective (1st person) and objective (3rd person) experience, which is one 
of the core mysteries of the mind. For at least the cases presented, there is NO theory of 
the 1st person experience that is consistent with the known theory, structure, and behavior 
of the brain. This also challenges several proposed mind/brain relations as  
epiphenomenalism or the notion that the 1st/3rd person link is a brute fact of nature that 
cannot be further analyzed. These would not yield inconsistency. 
 
In addition, throughout the history of science, crucial instances of inconsistency have led to 
profound reconsiderations and discoveries. One of the best-known cases is the fact that 
Rutherford’s planetary model of the atom entailed that electrons rotating around the atomic 
nucleus would radiate energy and eventually crash into it. This was one of a number of deep 
inconsistencies leading to the development of quantum theory. 
 
A recent important inconsistency in Cognitive Science is the “Word Superiority Effect” (34). A 
wide range of experiments established that people were faster and more accurate in 
recognizing the letter A in context, e.g., CAT, than the same letter alone. These results conflict 
with the naïve assumption that more input should require more processing. This was one of 
the inconsistencies resulting in the paradigm shift to massively parallel (connectionist) models 
of brain function. 
 
 
If there really are fundamental inconsistencies between visual experience (the mind) and the 
neural theory of the brain, this is a major challenge to the (currently dominant) theories that the 
mind is constituted entirely from the activity of the brain. As usual, Dennett is unequivocal: “Our 
minds are just what our brains non-miraculously do “(30, Preface). Not only philosophers are 
so dogmatic. Stanislas Dehaene, a leading experimentalist, says: “If you had any lingering 
doubts that your mental life arises entirely from the activity of the brain, these examples should 
lift them” (37, p.153).  No one has suggested how this postulated mind/brain interaction would 
work, and we will show here that the examples above cannot be explained within existing 
theories. There is always the possibility of a conceptual breakthrough, but it would entail 
abandoning some of our core beliefs about (at least) neural computation.  
  
There is a plausible functional story for the stable world experience and the related binding 
problem to be discussed below. First of all, we do have an integrated (top-down) sense of the 
space around us that we cannot currently see, based on memory and other sense data – 
primarily hearing and smell. In addition, since we are heavily visual, it is adaptive to use vision 
as broadly as possible. In fact, it would be extremely difficult to act in the world using only the 
bulls-eye images from Figure 1 and separated information on size, color, etc. The mind 
(somehow) encodes a more accurate version of the world than can be directly captured by our 
limited neural hardware. 
 
We should not be surprised that our subjective experience sometimes deviates from the 
information captured and processed by the visual system. Our senses and the nervous system 
in general evolved to help our bodies function effectively in a physical and social world that we 
cannot directly observe (36).  Given that such mental experiences are evolutionarily 
fundamental, what can we know about their physical realization?  There is an impressive body 
of work suggesting how aspects of subjective experience, closely related to the discussion 
here, seem to be needed for animals to deal with external space and to combine various 
sensory inputs and goals. At least some aspects of these experiences may well be found in 
cephalopods (38) and insects (36).  
 
This ecological requirement also reveals a deep problem in the use of the term “illusion”. The 
word is sometimes used to describe a perception that is inconsistent with external reality and 
sometimes to describe an experience that is inconsistent with the neural representation even 
when the subjective experience is more like external reality. To further confuse the issue, 
“illusion” is also used metaphorically, as in the postulated “illusion of Free Will” (31). Everyone 
agrees that we all act as if we had Free Will, even determinists who deny that they have this 
power. There does seem to be an agreed definition of “illusion” that supports its use in a 
serious discussion of the mind. 
 
Computational Limitations 
 
We will now prove that some everyday visual experiences cannot be explained within existing 
neuroscience. The basic form of the argument will be computational. There is no way that 
brain neurons, as we know them, could represent or compute the substrate of our visual 
experience. The constraint of explaining visual experience also rules out many proposed and 
speculative theories of neural computation in the human brain, as discussed below. To explore 
the details, we turn next to Figure 4 A, B.  
 
Figure 4 Flat map projection of the Human brain (5) 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 4A is a standard flattened projection of one hemisphere of the human brain with the 
various areas colored. The numbers refer to the traditional Brodmann classification of brain 
regions from their anatomical details. Modern methods (27, 35) have further refined this picture 
and elaborated the basic functions computed in these different areas. Figure 4B provides more 
detail on this functional separation in the visual system, which is at the core of the neural 
binding problem, one of our mysteries. 
 
The visual area V1, our main concern for the stable world experience and the subject of Figure 
3, is shown as the yellow area on the left of Figure 4A (as area 17) and as the magenta area in 
Figure 4B. Notice that V1 is the largest of the visual areas; this will be important for our 
discussion. 
 
 There are two additional lessons to be gleaned from Figure 4 above. First, 4A shows that the 
functionality of the cerebral cortex is basically known (5, 27, 35) – there is no large available 
space for neural computation of currently mysterious phenomena. In addition, various aspects 
of our visual experience are primarily computed in distinct and often distant interacting circuits. 
For example, in Figure 4B color calculation is based in the bright green area V4v and motion 
calculation involves several areas: V3, V3A, MT, etc.  In spite of this extreme separation of 
function, we experience the world as an integrated image with objects that combine all visual 
properties and even associate these with other senses like sound when appropriate.  The 
mystery of how this happens is called the “hard binding problem” (3). 
 
 There are two immediate challenges to address in “the experience of the stable visual world”:  
apparent stability over saccades and the detailed perception of the full visual field. One popular 
idea is to suppose that the perceived full field is pieced together as a mosaic of “bull’s-eye” 
views (Figure 3) from many saccades. There are two serious flaws in this story, one temporal 
and one spatial, as an explanation of the experience. We only make about 3~4 saccades per 
second – this is too slow for stable vision (movies are ~ 20 frames per second). In addition, 3 
or 4 such images would not yield nearly enough detailed information to build a detailed full field 
view.  
 
 In addition, it would require a huge area of visual neurons to encode the detailed full field view 
that we subjectively perceive. We can give a quantitative estimate of what is involved. There 
are a number of alternative calculations, but they all confirm the basic point that fine resolution 
over a large visual field would require brain area several times larger than V1 (Figure 4). 
  
Stan Klein, who has looked extensively at this issue, suggests the following analysis focusing 
on the retinal ganglion cells –RGC. The key equations from (14) are: 
 
Thr(Ecc) = Thr(fovea)*(1 + Ecc/E2)   or 
Sep(Ecc) = Sep(fovea)*(1 + Ecc/E2)   
 
where Thr (or Sep) is threshold (or separation) in minutes. 
and Ecc is eccentricity in deg 
and E2 is the eccentricity at which Thr or Sep double.  
 
E2 is the number of degrees of eccentricity at which the spacing of V1 neurons or 
ganglion cells double. Levi et al. (14) found E2=0.7 deg for cortical cells and is about 1.0 
deg for ganglion cells. That is, for ganglion cells the spacing would be s = 0.5 (Ecc + 1) 
min so at Ecc=0 the spacing is about 0.5 min and at 20 deg it is about 10 min, 20 times 
as much. This calculation suggests that it might require 20 times as much V1 area to 
capture the precision of the fovea out to 20 deg of visual angle. 
 
From a slightly different perspective, the cortical magnification factor says that the resolution at 
20 degrees eccentricity is 20 times worse than at the foveal projection. This is because of 
retinal under-sampling in the periphery; the detailed information is only captured at the fovea of 
the retina (13). Also, the dense neural circuits in the V1 foveal projection has about 200,000 
cells per square mm, while at 20 degrees out it is more like 4,000 cells per square mm (15). 
This is a factor of 50:1 denser in the V1 foveal projection than in the periphery. The V1 foveal 
projection occupies about a quarter of region on the left in Figure 4.  For the brain to encode 
our detailed perception out to 20 degrees would require an area roughly 12 times the size of 
V1. There is no way that an area nearly this large could fit into Figure 4. The remarkable recent 
advances (27, 35) describing a much more detailed parcellation of human cerebral cortex 
provides even stronger evidence against unknown visual areas. 
 
 We can also consider the evidence from the hundreds of full-brain scanning experiments that 
are exploring which brain locations are active for various vision tasks (16, 17, 18, 35).  This 
precludes the possibility that a network large enough to capture a detailed image could remain 
undetected. 
 
 In summary, as long as we believe that more detail requires more neurons, there is no place 
in the brain that could encode a basis for the detailed large field image that we experience. 
This analysis disproves more than the idea of unknown brain circuitry that underlies our stable 
world experience. It also refutes any plausible substrate for other proposals such as complete 
“remapping” which suggest that all of the information from one saccade is (somehow) mapped 
to the input coming from the next saccade (7, p.557). 
 
 The binding problem (3, 41) is a closely related mystery of vision that we can consider, also 
based on Figure 4. Although the full computational story is more complex, it is the case that 
different visual features are largely computed in separate brain areas. However, we experience 
the world as coherent entities combining various properties such as size, shape, color, texture, 
motion, etc. (39). Again, there is no place in the brain that could encode a detailed substrate 
for what we effortlessly perceive. This also suggests that our subjective perception (somehow) 
integrates activity from different brain circuits. Various forms of the binding problem are also 
the subject of ongoing research (3, 19) 
 
  
A Touchstone for alternative brain theories 
 
The discussion above is based on the standard theory (20) that information processing in the 
brain is based on complex networks of neurons that communicate over long distances mainly 
by electrical spikes and learn mainly through changes in the connections (synapses) between 
neurons. This theory also includes a wide range of other chemical and developmental factors, 
but none that would affect the basic results above. 
 
However, there are a number of alternative proposals that deny the centrality of standard 
neural computation and several of these are being actively discussed (21, 22, 23); two good 
sources for a wide range of alternative models are the Journal of Consciousness Studies and 
http://consciousness.arizona.edu. One reason for this interest in alternative theories is that 
everyone agrees that the current standard theory does not support a reductionist explanation 
of historic mind-brain problems like subjective experience and consciousness. The standard 
theory continues to yield scientific and clinical progress, so any new proposal should be 
consistent with it. 
 
Alternative ideas on the basis for brain information processing include quantum effects (28) 
and central roles for the glia, for the neuropil, or for microtubules. All of the suggestions for 
some sub-neural substrate for perception suffer from the same problem – the only known 
mechanism for the requisite fast long-distance communication in the brain is neural spikes.  
 
More general architectural suggestions include global workspace model (40) and the Tononi 
information model (21). Many proposals suggest some unspecified mass action of neural 
assemblies, following a long tradition (23). Cohen et al. (26) show how known results on 
summary statistics and peripheral vision explain some of people’s ability to get the “gist” of a 
scene without capturing all of the detail of subjective perception. After extensive analysis and 
modeling of peripheral vision and what she calls "the awareness puzzle", Rosenholtz (42) 
concludes that "Perception is inherently something of an illusion". 
 
 Edwards (25) suggests another approach – unified perception (and consciousness) is based 
on wave patterns in the membranes of individual cells.  All of these ideas presuppose that 
there is some substrate (NCC) for subjective experience in the brain, but there are also more 
radical theories like that of Alva Noe (22). He claims to explain how "we enjoy an experience of 
worldly detail that is not present in our brains".  Starting from a standard argument that utilities 
are the basis for perception, Hoffman (33) suggests that: “Your apple and my apple are 
distinct, just as your headache is distinct from my headache. Something in the objective world 
triggers us both to perceive an apple, but whatever that thing might be in the objective world, it 
is almost certainly nonspatial, nontemporal, and in no way resembles an apple” 
 
Since the deep mind-brain phenomena of most common interest are not well defined, it has 
not been straightforward to evaluate any of these suggested alternatives to the standard model 
of neural computation. The findings described above could yield concrete touchstone 
problems for proposed theories of representation, computation, and communication in the 
brain. Both the binding problem and the experience of a detailed stable visual scene are 
ubiquitous in daily life, are functionally necessary, and have clear informational requirements. 
We could ask proponents of speculative brain models how their theory could account for these 
two concrete phenomena. That is, assume your theory is true and show how it helps explain 
these (or other) touchstone problems. I have done this informally with several leading 
proponents of alternative models and have never heard even a vague claim of adequacy.  
 
The general acceptance of some such touchstone tasks could sharpen the discussion of 
information processing in the brain. Of course, the deep mind-brain problem remains a 
mystery, but we should expect proposed models of neural computation to address some of the 
concrete touchstone problems, like those discussed here. 
 
 
Experiments 
 
We have shown that existing neuroscience cannot address all the basic questions of 
subjective experience. Of course, very productive communities are working on many aspects 
of cognitive and perceptual neuroscience. There is a wide range of motivations for these 
efforts, but these do not usually include trying to elucidate remaining mysteries, such as the 
ones discussed here. There are risks involved in attacking difficult problems and relatively few 
such efforts in the current stressful research environment. 
 
Nevertheless, there is some research that is making progress on demystifying some of the 
mysteries of subjective experience.  In the Fall of 2017, a UC Berkeley interdisciplinary 
seminar course explored “Science and Subjectivity “ http://rctn.org/wiki/VS298:_Subjectivity  . 
This web site for the course contains references and video lecture recordings for a wide range 
of research that pushes on the boundary between routine science and remaining mysteries. 
Week 3 contains lecture and discussion on the material in this article. The web site also 
includes presentations and discussion by Michael Cohen, Jerry Feldman, Rich Ivry, Stan Klein, 
Bob Knight, Christof Koch, Ken Nakayama, Brian Odegaard, Bruno Olshausen, Terry Regier, 
Shin Shimojo, and Peter Tse. If there is a scientific explanation of these mysteries, it will need 
to be an evolutionary story, so it should be fruitful to focus on a wide range of animals (36, 38) 
 
Conclusions 
 
 There is general agreement that there are mysteries about the world and our place in it that 
are not yet understood. Even radical materialists will concede that there are questions (e.g. 
free will) that might never have scientific solutions. Nevertheless, it is not widely understood 
that, every time we open our eyes, we experience phenomena that cannot be explained with 
existing neuroscience and possibly not with any science. 
 
 As thinkers, we have no choice but to acknowledge that we do not know and may never know 
the answers to many deep questions about the world and ourselves (24).  There are two basic 
ways to learn about the physical and social world:  investigation and stories. Science is a 
uniquely powerful tool of investigation, but is limited in scope at least at present.  Of course, 
there remains a vast amount that can and should be explored and exploited scientifically. 
Stories can provide insights that are not directly testable, and this is certainly also important in 
science. The stories in art, mythology, religion, etc. have been and will remain powerful 
sources of guidance about how to live. 
 
 Initial attempts to convey the ideas in this note have not been very successful. I find that 
scientists have a strong negative reaction to my simple demonstrations. On the other hand, 
philosophers and humanists welcome any attack on reductionism. However, it seems like both 
responses are mainly territorial. It does not appear to be too much of a stretch to view the 
(Eastern or Western) religious practitioners as another special interest group. It is certainly true 
that all these groups have emotional/spiritual as well as financial/power stakes in the big 
questions, but there does not seem to be much support for the agnostic mysterian position "we 
simply don't know".  
 
Everyone is entitled to his or her own (religious or other) beliefs, but there is nothing in our 
current ignorance that privileges one faith over all others.  Belief in the inevitability of complete 
scientific answers (8, 21, 30) is one such faith. There are beliefs (e.g. about the age of the 
Earth) that contradict established scientific knowledge and cannot be taken seriously. 
Somewhat surprisingly, there seems to be little support in cognitive and neuro science for "we 
simply don't know". This is despite the fact "we simply don't know and may never know" is the 
accepted response in physics for some fundamental questions. What has been most surprising 
is how many people prefer believing there must be an (inscrutable) reductionist answer rather 
than accepting the agnostic stance. Even philosophers, who consider the mind/brain problem 
as a possible feature of nature, try to prove their contention rather than leave it as one 
possibility (8). This all might be related to recent findings suggesting an innate human drive to 
find answers for unanswerable questions (32). 
 
Nevertheless, in the face of all that is unknown, we (following the physicists) would do well to 
appreciate both what is scientifically known and also the mysteries that remain. Ideally, results 
like those above will encourage theory and experiment on questions at the boundaries 
between the known and unknown.  
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